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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Upstream – Federal
9th Cir.
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437 (9th Cir. 2018).
The surface estate and one-third of the mineral estate of a ranch in Montana
was sold to Current Owner, while two-thirds of the mineral estate was
retained by Previous Owners. Dinosaur fossils were found on the ranch’s
property, and the two parties disputed over who owned the fossils and
whether the fossils were minerals or not. Current Owner sought a
declaratory judgment that they own the fossils as owners of the surface
estate, while Previous Owners removed the case to federal court and sought
their own declaratory judgment that the fossils were part of the mineral
estate and that Previous Owners owned two-thirds of the fossils. The
district court granted summary judgment to Current Owner, stating that the
fossils were not minerals under Montana law. Previous Owners appealed.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first refuted the district court’s
definition of mineral as requiring something to be mined and refined, which
excluded the fossils. Instead, the court found that the dinosaur fossils were
minerals in the sense that, like coal or oil, they were composed of once
living beings, and the fossils fit the more generic word “use” in the sense
that they are displayed and viewed in museums. The court next found that
the Montana Supreme Court used the Heinatz test to determine if something
is a mineral, whether it fits the scientific definition of mineral, and whether
it has a special quality to make it valuable. The court rejected Current
Owner’s argument that this non-categorical test is too confusing. The court
applied this test to the fossils and found that the fossils were scientifically
minerals and had special value. The court held that the fossils were
minerals and thus part of the mineral estate. As such, the court reversed
the decision of the lower court.
Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 334 F. Supp. 3d 174 (D.D.C. 2018).
Lessee sued several federal agencies and officers (“Agencies”) for
cancelling its oil and gas lease in violation of the APA, seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief. The lease, originally approved in 1982 by the Bureau
of Land Management (“BLM”), was suspended in 1993 to conduct
additional environmental assessments, but was then suspended each year
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after for approximately 20 years. After litigation and a court order to submit
a revised schedule, Agencies cancelled the lease, asserting that the original
lease violated the NEPA and the NHPA. In the present case, Lessee alleged
that: (1) the cancellation was arbitrary and capricious; (2) the cancellation
fell outside the statute of limitations; (3) Agencies should be estopped from
cancelling the lease; and (4) the lease was properly issued in compliance
with the NEPA and NHPA. The court found that Agencies acted arbitrarily
and capriciously by: (1) giving no notice of the cancellation; (2) not
considering Lessee’s reliance interests; and (3) waiting 33 years to correct
an agency error which was easily discoverable. In finding the Agency’s
actions to be arbitrary and capricious, the court found no need to address
the remaining issues and granted Lessee’s motion for summary judgment.
Upstream – State
Louisiana
Gilmer v. Principle Energy, L.L.C., 52,218 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18); 256
So. 3d 1139.
On April 1, 2008, Landowner executed a royalty conveyance to Operator,
which had a prescriptive period of three years, with a clause stating that a
shut-in well would perpetuate the term of the deed. Within a year, a well
was completed on Landowner’s property, but was never placed in
production as it was awaiting pipeline. The well was classified as a shut-in
well by the state regulatory agency. In May 2009, the state agency created a
unit and designated the well as the unit well. A new well was completed on
April 30, 2011, which was then authorized to be the unit well and produced
in paying quantities. Landowner sued, arguing that the prescription had
accrued and sought a release from the royalty conveyance. The trial court
granted summary judgement in favor of Operator. Here, the court affirmed
the trial court’s decision. Citing precedent holding that the existence of a
completed, shut-in well on a validly created unit is enough to interrupt a
prescription, the court held that the prescription was interrupted and began
anew in May 2009 when the state agency created the unit and designated
the original well as the unit well. Since the alterative unit well started
producing within a three years from the new prescription period, the
prescription had been continuously interrupted by the production of
minerals from the well. For these reasons the court affirmed the trial court’s
grant of summary judgement in favor of Operator.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

678

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

Marlborough Oil & Gas, L.L.C v. Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations, Inc.,
2018-0557 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/14/18); No. 2018 CA 0557, 2018 WL
5961770.
Operator perfected an oil well lien on a well owned by Lessee that was
found to be a dry hole. The trial court found that the lien had no real legal
effect, and Operator appealed. The trial court found in favor of Lessee in
part because the description of the operating interest was deficient—it only
referenced the particular well and not a description of an operating interest.
However, the appellate court ruled that Louisiana Revised Statute
9:4868(A)(5) permits a description including the name and serial or other
identification of the well and the name of the field where it is located in
relation to perfecting an oil well lien. As such, the court reversed the trial
court in favor of Operator.
North Dakota
Johnson v. Statoil Oil & Gas LP, 2018 ND 227, 918 N.W.2d 58 (N.D.
2018).
Petitioner appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Oil
Company in a dispute over oil and gas leases. The parties’ dispute revolved
around five out of eight well-heads that were not producing oil in “paying
quantities” and whether the lease for such wells was finished at the end of
the three-year lease under Pugh clauses, or extended because of ongoing
drilling operations elsewhere on the leased property under “the habendum
and continuous drilling clauses.” The Supreme Court of North Dakota
first clarified that the Pugh clauses in this case are different from the Pugh
clause in the case of Egeland v. Continental Resources, Inc., which Oil
Company relied on. The Pugh clauses in the current case identified “both
the land subject to an extension and the method of the extension” as
opposed to the Egeland Pugh clause that only defined the land subject to
extension. The Court then concluded that the Pugh clauses, which defined
extension by production quantity of oil, the continuous drilling operations
clauses, and the habendum clauses, which defined extension by production
or drilling, were incompatible and could not be “harmonized” as Oil
Company would like. The Court then concluded that because the Pugh
clauses were actually added by the parties, as opposed to the other clauses
which were just part of the forms to begin with, the Pugh clauses should
govern the method of extension. Since the Pugh clauses governed the
method of extension as production of oil in “paying quantities,” which the
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five well-heads were not producing, the Court found that the lease for
those five wells could not be extended. The Court accordingly reversed
the judgment of the district court.
Ohio
Dundics v. Eric Petroleum Corp., 2018-Ohio-3826, No. 2017-0448, 2018
WL 4627711.
Two oil and gas professionals (“Landmen”) met with a petroleum
corporation (“Corporation”) to discuss the venture of acquiring oil and gas
leases. Corporation entered into an agreement by which Landmen would
find property owners and negotiate leases for exploration and production of
oil and gas. In exchange, Corporation would compensate Landmen with
fixed payment for every leased acre and a percentage of the proceeds from
working wells. Landmen brought an action for damages, breach of contract,
conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. Corporation
moved to dismiss because Landmen were not licensed real estate brokers
and could not bring an action for conducting real estate activities. The issue
was whether Landmen needed to be licensed real estate brokers to enter into
oil and gas leases. The Ohio Supreme Court held that an oil and gas lease
falls within the definition of real estate set forth in Ohio law and the
negotiation of which requires a real-estate-broker’s license pursuant to Ohio
law. The Court was aware of the historical role landmen played in Ohio, but
reasoned that the plain meaning of the statutes clearly expressed the intent
to include negotiating oil and gas leases within the scope of activities that
require a real estate broker’s license.
Thompson v. Custer, NO. 2017-Ohio-4476, 2018 WL 5794135 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 5, 2018).
Surface Owner owned the surface on the disputed tract of land, as well as a
½ undivided interest in the minerals. Mineral Owner owned a ½ undivided
interest in the minerals beneath the disputed tract of land. Both Surface
Owner and Mineral Owner possessed an undivided right to lease their
minerals. Surface Owner leased the entire disputed tract of land to
Operator. Operator discovered that ½ of the minerals did not belong to
Surface Owner, and only paid Surface Owner a bonus proportionate to his
½ interest in the minerals beneath the disputed tract of land. Surface Owner
then filed an Affidavit of Abandonment on Mineral Owner’s interest, and
Mineral Owner Responded. Mineral Owner then sought ½ of the bonus
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payment paid onto Surface Owner. The Court of Appeals of Ohio took the
case to weigh in on the bonus payment question and abandonment question.
The court ruled that even though Mineral Owner had responded to the
Affidavit of Abandonment in time to protect their title, they were not due a
share of the proceeds from the leases entered into by opposite mineral
interest owner. The court ruled that an undivided ½ mineral interest owner
who has an undivided ½ power to lease does not have to pay a
proportionate share of royalties, or bonuses from the leases he enters into,
to the other ½ mineral interest owner. Furthermore, the operator does not
have to pay ½ of the royalty to the non-leasing mineral interest owner.
Finally, Surface Owner argued that the lands had been unconstitutionally
taken from them, but the court quickly dispensed with this issue, as the
minerals owned by Mineral Owner had never vested in Surface Owner, so
they could not be unconstitutionally taken away. Mineral Owner was not
entitled to half of the bonus payment but did retain the title to their
minerals.
Pennsylvania
Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 39-42 C.D. 2018, 2018
WL 5831186 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 8, 2018).
Objector challenged Zoning Board’s (“Board”) grant of special exceptions
to Company for oil and gas operations, specifically that: (1) Company’s
proposal failed to satisfy toxic water storage requirements; (2) the
proposal failed to protect citizens’ environmental rights; and (3) the
proposal represented a high probability of danger to the public health and
safety. The first issue was a question of fact, so the appellate court deferred
to the fact-finder, Zoning Board. The special exception, by its nature, was
noted as presumptively operating within the zoning requirements, and the
record further supported Board’s finding that Company’s proposed
wastewater storage did not violate ordinance requirements as the storage
was of “brine” rather than toxic materials. Objector’s second issue
challenged the sufficiency of Board’s environmental protection measures
taken in conjunction with granting the special exceptions to Company. The
appellate court noted that applicants such as Company can, and did, bear
the burden of evidentiary proof and persuasion, but in this specific context,
Board considered expert testimony offered by both parties and
appropriately determined that Company’s studies were more persuasive for
granting the exception. In addition, Board attached a condition of
environmental monitoring and protection to the grant. Lastly, Objector
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argued that substantial evidence existed that the oil and gas operations
would cause harm to the public health and safety, as well as general
community interests. The court denied Objector’s claims because adverse
impacts must be argued in specificity, and Objector’s claims were too
speculative to overturn Board’s rulings. Many claims, such as concerns
over noise or air quality, were explicitly discussed by the Board’s
conditional approval of Company’s exceptions, making Objector’s general
complaints less credible. Other concerns, such as traffic, required proofs of
harm (such as accident reports) prior to receiving a court’s consideration.
Therefore, the court upheld Board’s decision.

This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Texas
Archer v. Tregellas, No. 17-0093, No. 17-0094, 2018 WL 6005071 (Tex.
Nov. 16, 2018).
The dispute concered the statute of limitations on a claim for breach of a
right of first refusal. A mineral interest was conveyed by Grantor without
giving Holder, the holder of the right of first refusal, notice of the potential
conveyance. The court ruled that a right of first refusal is breached when
the property is conveyed to a third party without giving notice to the right
holder. However, the discovery rule applies, and the statute of limitations
on the claim only runs once the right holder knows, or should know, of the
breach. The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Grantor breached Holder’s
Right of First Refusal by not giving Holder notice of the potential
conveyance.
CCI Gulf Coast Upstream, LLC v. Circle X Camp Cooley, LTD, No. 10-1700325-CV, 2018 WL 4624012 (Tex. App. Sept. 26, 2018).
Lessor sued Lessee, asserting that Lessee violated the lease agreement by
denying Lessor free use of gas produced on the property. The trial court
found in favor of Lessor, and Lessee appealed, arguing that: (1) the free-gas
clause in the lease was indefinite and therefore violated the statute of
frauds; and (2) that enforcement of the free-gas clause would implicate
public health and safety concerns due to the level of hydrogen sulfide
contained in the gas. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision,
rejecting both of Lessee’s arguments, instead holding that: (1) the lease
language allowing Lessor to use gas free of charge “out of any gas not
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needed for operations hereunder” for “lands in the vicinity owned by the
lessor” was quantifiable and determinable; and (2) Lessee did not articulate
any statute, regulation, opinion, or public policy which would be violated
by the free-gas clause and thus failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to
the clause’s enforceability. For these reasons, the court affirmed the trial
court’s decision.

Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 563 S.W.3d 449
(Tex. App. 2018).
Company appealed summary judgment in favor of Corporation regarding
the judicial interpretation of contractual oil and gas agreements between
the parties. Specifically, Company objected to an interpretation of unused
days as it applied to a continuous development program described in the
contract. The contract allowed Company to retain a leasehold interest after
the primary term of the lease expired so long as it maintained a continuous
development program. The appellate court reviewed the summary judgment
de novo. The court reviewed the lease agreement as a contractual
relationship, and so afforded the terms of the contract their plain meaning
and used the terms of the contract to give effect to the intent of the parties.
The terms stated that Company could accumulate unused days in any 150day term to be used in the next. Company asserted it could continue to
accumulate unused days so long as it continued to drill every 150 days,
whereas Corporation would limit the accumulation of unused days to the
immediately preceding well. Applying plain definitional meanings to the
terms, the court recognized the use of the word “next” within the contract.
As “next” was defined as “immediately adjacent,” the court accepted
Corporation’s interpretation. Although Company argued that the 150-day
limit was merely a “label,” upon which unused days could be added so long
as they were available, the court recognized the continued use of the phrase
within the contract as descriptive, and therefore instructive to the
interpretation. Taken in conjunction with the term “next,” “150-days” was a
clear limitation agreed to by the parties. The court noted, “[w]hen the terms
of a contract are plain, definite, and unambiguous, courts must enforce the
contract as written.” The plain language also supported economic
development of the land, and therefore the court affirmed the interpretation
in favor of Corporation.
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M&M Res., Inc. v. DSTJ, LLP, NO. 09-18-00083-CV, 2018 WL 5986002
(Tex. App. Nov. 15, 2018).
Assignor brought this action against Assignee. Assignor sued Assignee to
recover back payments and decide who held rightful title to the mineral
interests. The trial court ruled in favor of Assignor and vacated Assignee's
title to the mineral interests. This dispute addressed the confusion
surrounding whether claimant is seeking relief related to property interests
through a trespass-to-try-title action or a suit under the Declaratory
Judgement Act. The two actions cannot be brought together. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court and ruled that a dispute involving a claim of
superior title and the determination of possessory interests in the property
must be brought as a trespass-to-try-title action. Because the dispute
involved the ownership of a possessory interest in the mineral estate at
issue, a trespass-to-try-title action was proper.
Weed v. Frost Bank, No. 04-17-00811-CV, 2018 WL 5927987 (Tex. App.
Nov. 14, 2018).
The dispute concerns the estate of Husband and Wife and the mineral
interests therein. Husband has perished, and Descendants brought this
action to contend that the disputed oil and gas interests were separate
property from the marital estate. Bank, as the independent executor of
Husband's estate, contended that the mineral interests were community
property of the marital estate as a matter of law. While Husband was
married to Wife, he entered into a number of oil and gas leases, several of
which included recitals indicating Husband was entering into the leases
independent of anyone else—including Wife. However, the appellate court
sided with Bank, finding that the interests were, in fact, community
property of the marital estate. Husband spent time, toil, and effort
acquiring the oil and gas interests. Oil and gas was the primary business of
Husband and Wife. It was immaterial whether or not Husband spent his
own separate funds purchasing and leasing the minerals, because, under the
Texas community property system, any property or rights acquired by one
of the spouses after marriage by toil, talent, and efforts are assets of the
community estate—the rationale being that any talent, time, or effort
expended by a spouse is the asset of the community estate. As such, the
court ruled in favor of Bank finding that the oil and gas interests in dispute
were a part of the community estate.
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Midstream – Federal
S.D. Illinois
Nodine v. Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P., No. 10-CV-163-SMY-DGW, 2018
WL 4636242 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2018).
Environmentalist filed class action suit against Operator under the Oil
Pollution Act (“OPA”) and Illinois state law after the rupture of a pipeline
fitting at a pump station, alleging that it had a defective leak detector
causing crude oil to leak into a containment dike. Environmentalist also
alleged that Operator knew erosion caused the leakage up to eight days
before the spill. Environmentalist contended that 4,000 gallons of crude oil
contaminated the surrounding area and water sources of the nearby
communities. In response, Operator filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim of recoverable damages under OPA, arguing that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction after Environmentalist failed to satisfy the
mandatory presentment clause of OPA. Environmentalist’s complaint
included a “sum certain” assessment of the damage to the environment and
a quantification of socioeconomic damages to the putative class.
Environmentalist’s claims included damage to 380 residential parcels and
120 agricultural parcels. Because the court found that the claims were
sufficiently pleaded for the purposes of an initial complaint, the motion to
dismiss was denied.
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal
6th Cir.
Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Util. Co., 905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2018).
The court in this case answered whether pollution that reaches navigable
waters by way of groundwater is subject to the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that it is not, however, it is
the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (“RCRA”) that governs this
conduct. Conservationists brought suit against Company, alleging that
Company’s coal ash storage in coal ash ponds led to contamination of a
nearby lake in violation of the CWA and RCRA. The court made a strong
delineation between the CWA, which governs water pollution, and the
RCRA, which governs solid waste. Company combines its excess coal ash
with water and pumps that wastewater mixture into nearby ponds for
disposal. The ash ponds were built on karst terrain, which allows for
groundwater to move more quickly through the earth. Conservationists
argued that this type of terrain effectively transforms the groundwater into a
point source, from which the ash solution pollutes nearby navigable waters.
However, the court determined that the CWA does not apply to
groundwater, regardless of the type of terrain it travels through to reach
navigable waters, thus rejecting Conservationists’ “point source” theory and
“hydrological connection theory.” The court noted that a point source is a
discrete conveyance, which does not describe the seeping of coal ash into
groundwater. This lack of directness excluded Company from CWA
liability. However, the court did note that the RCRA does apply to this case,
Conservations met the requirements of bringing an RCRA claim, and the
federal courts should exercise jurisdiction over this claim.
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir.
2018).
Conservation Organization brought suit against the Tennessee Valley
Authority (“TVA”), claiming breaches of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)
regarding the discharge of coal ash pollutants through groundwater
hydrologically-connected to navigable waters. Additionally, organization
alleged TVA violated the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(“NPDES”) by violating its permit regarding effluent limitations and
sanitary sewer outflow provision. TVA engaged in common practice of
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“sluicing” of coal ash and disposing of the mixture in coal ash ponds, where
leaks into the groundwater occurred, eventually discharging the mixture
into the Cumberland River, which is a navigable waterway. The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed “hydrological connection theory,”
which argues that the discharge of pollutants from the coal-ash mixture into
the groundwater constituted a point source consistent with the CWA. The
court reasoned that the introduction of pollutants into groundwater did not
fall within the gambit of the CWA. Additionally, the court determined that
TVA did not violate its NPDES permit, containing removed-substances and
sanitary-sewer overflow provisions, by discharging the coal-ash mixture, as
those provisions plainly did not apply to such discharge. As such, the court
determined that the district court’s injunction was an abuse of discretion
and reversed, finding no CWA liability for TVA.
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS
Federal
Fed. Cl.
Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. v. United States, 140 Fed.Cl. 447 (Fed.
Cl. 2018).
Council sued Government for breach of trust pursuant to the ArizonaFlorida Land Exchange Act and the American Indian Trust Fund
Management Reform Act of 1994 (“Acts”). Council claimed that
Government failed to meet trust obligations under the Acts. The court had
previously dismissed portions of Council’s initial complaint but addressed
ongoing district court litigation between Government and a private
corporation to enforce the sought-after payments, of which the corporation
was supposed to have paid under the Acts and an agreement with
Government. Though the corporation paid a settlement to Council, Council
filed the current complaint, claiming that the payment did not resolve the
dispute with Government. The court held that parts of the claim were
barred by statutes of limitation and other parts of the claim were
insufficiently pleaded. Further, the court held that Government satisfied its
obligation of adequate security by suing the private corporation in federal
district court for more than the Release Level Amount and was not required
to make up default payments. The court reasoned that because Government
sued the private corporation to provide sufficient security, it was not liable
for any deficiencies in annual interest payments.
State
California
Rozanova v. Uribe, No. H044161, 2018 WL 5000022 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
16, 2018).
Landowner 1 owns a lot with the portion of the parking lot in dispute, while
Landowner 2 owns the neighboring lot where the rest of the parking lot is
located. Landowner 2 filed claims against Landowner 1 claiming (1)
prescriptive easement, (2) equitable easements, (3) easement by estoppel,
(4) agreed boundary, and (5) declaratory relief. Landowner 1 asserted
trespass claims against Landowner 2 and sought injunctive relief. The trial
court found in favor of Landowner 1. Landowner 2 appealed, and the
appellate court found no error in any of the trial courts findings, but
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remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether Landowner 2
had rights to the portion of the parking lot on their own property. The
appellate court held that the trial court’s order enjoining Landowner 2 from
entering into Landowner 1’s land was ambiguous. Thus, the injunction
could be seen as precluding Landowner 2 from entering it owns lot. The
appellate court reversed and remanded the order so the trial court could
ensure that it could not be so construed as precluding Landowner 2 from the
use of his private road.

This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Pennsylvania
Cogan House Twp. v. Lenhart, 197 A.3d 1264 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018).
Township alleged that Landowners were improperly modifying drainage
systems and easements by a road. Landowners brought an injunction,
claiming that Township made modifications in violation of several laws and
trespassed. Township had modified roads and drain-ways that affected
storm water runoff, which triggered duties under the Storm Water
Management Act (“SWMA”). Such duties included a duty to prevent injury
from the changes and a duty to submit plans for permits from the State
Department of Environmental Protection to prevent erosion and sediment
movement. The court found that Township had violated its duties to submit
and gain approval of its plans and to mitigate liability to adjacent
properties. The court also found that Landowners had failed to comply with
SWMA in the same manner when modifying the road to mitigate the
changes caused by Township. Finally, the court concluded that the violation
by Township did not create a liability in quantifiable damage to
Landowners, and that failure to comply with SWMA did not create a
liability. As such, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Frederick v. Allegheny Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 196 A.3d 677 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2018).
Landowners challenged a zoning ordinance that allowed petroleum and
natural gas operations in all districts. They also challenged Board’s grant of
a permit for a gas well by Landowners’ farm. Board rejected Landowners’
challenges. Landowners sought judicial review of the rejections, and the
court affirmed the Board’s determination. Landowners subsequently
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appealed. States have the power to zone and plan under their general police
powers. Zoning ordinances must balance community interest and the due
process rights of private property owners. So long as the State’s zoning
determinations are reasonably related to the public health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of its population, its decision is constitutional and the
court will defer. When a Zoning Board makes a finding of fact based on
substantial evidence, the findings are binding on courts of review.
Landowners feared that putting a pump on the land would significantly alter
the land, such that they would not be able to use it for farming purposes
once the drilling was done. Board found that the disruptive pumping
Landowners complained of would only occur within a short period of time,
and after that, the land would return to its current state. Furthermore, Board
found that such use would benefit the community by allowing other
property owners to fully utilize their mineral and oil deposits. Also, such
use would not affect neighboring property owners. Based on these findings
of fact, the court affirmed the Board’s rejection.
Texas
In re Wood Grp. PSN Inc., No. 04-18-00418-CV, 2018 WL 4760139 (Tex.
App. Oct. 3, 2018).
County brought suit against twenty-nine Oilfield Businesses asserting
claims of negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. Specifically,
County claimed that Oilfield Businesses negligently or intentionally used
the road in a manner that damaged the road when accessing their oil and gas
leases. Oilfield Businesses asked the court to dismiss the claims against
them with prejudice as they claimed they could not be held liable for
ordinary wear and tear of the road and because County failed to point to
specific instances of damage causing negligence. The court determined the
key issue was whether Oilfield Businesses owed a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect County’s road from injury other than by ordinary
wear and tear. Critically, the court ruled that County’s allegation that
Oilfield Businesses used the road in an abnormal manner was conclusory.
Further, County had not alleged that the road was intended for a specific
group or that there was any notice that heavy vehicles could not use the
road. As a result, the court concluded that County’s pleading failed to show
a basis in law that Oilfield Businesses had anything more than a moral duty
to not damage the roads.
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS
Traditional Generation
Utah
Wasatch Cty. v. Util. Facility Review Bd., 2018 UT App 191, 2018 WL
4846256 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2018).
County was forced by Review Board to issue a conditional use permit so
that a power company could construct transmission towers and lines after
County tried to refuse the permit and sought, but did not obtain, a stay from
Review Board. County sought judicial review, but did not seek a stay on the
issuing of the permit, so the permit was issued and the transmission lines
constructed during the judicial review proceedings. The appellate court
found the entire appeal moot, because County failed to obtain a stay from
this court regarding the construction of the towers and the towers had
already been fully built by the time of the judicial process. The completed
construction and failure to seek and obtain a stay, under prior Utah case
law, rendered the case moot. Additionally, the court found that County’s
sought remedy, “revocation of the conditional use permit,” was unavailable,
because the permit had not been obtained through “mistake of fact,
misrepresentation, or fraud” as prohibited in the county code. Thus, the
county code was inapplicable and the remedy made unavailable. As
such, the court dismissed the case as moot.
Renewable Generation
North Carolina
In re De Luca, 817 S.E.2d 919 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).
De Luca appealed a North Carolina Utilities Commission decision, which
declared that Energy Company was not a public utility and thus not under
the Commission’s jurisdiction in its dealings with another company. The
court reviewed the Commission’s decision de novo. The court found that
Energy Company was not a public utility for two reasons. First, the
court determined that Energy Company did not sell energy to the public,
as required by statute to qualify as a public utility, because it only produces
energy for sale to another company, which then sells that energy to the
public. The court also decided that just because the subsequent company
sells the energy to the public and qualifies as a public utility, this does not
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make the electricity production company a public utility. Second, the court
found that Energy Company’s production of electricity did not create
competition in the marketplace of public electricity sales and thus kept with
North Carolina’s established regional monopolies for the sale of electricity
to keep the sales well-regulated. As such, appellate court affirmed the
Utilities Commission’s decision.
Rate – Federal
W.D. Pennsylvania
Brown v. Agway Energy Servs., LLC, 328 F. Supp. 3d 464 (W.D. Pa. 2018).
Customer sued Electric Generation Supplier (“EGS”), a seller of electricity,
in a class action for breach of contract. Customer alleged that EGS
improperly priced electricity in terms of rates. EGS purchased energy from
energy production companies and sold energy to consumers. The court
applied three elements to determine whether or not there was a valid breach
of contract claim: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) a breach of duty
imposed by the contract; and (3) damages. The court held that there was no
breach of duty pursuant to EGS’s pricing for electricity. The court reasoned
that because the consumer contract included discretion and varying factors
in calculation of rates, Customer had failed to state a claim for breach of
contract. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher
court as of publication.
Rate – State
Nebraska
City of Sidney v. Mun. Energy Agency, 917 N.W. 2d 826 (Neb. 2018).
Agency sued Energy Provider over monthly transmission rate charges. An
arbitration board ruled that Energy Provider breached the agreed upon
service schedule. The board opined that Energy Provider “unnecessarily
and unilaterally” changed transmission paths. The board ruled that the
transmission rate was excessive, unfair, and unreasonable. Energy Provider
brought the current action for review of the board’s decision. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska ruled that the increased rate was not arbitrary. The Court
further opined that the increase was necessary for the continued operation
of Energy Provider. The Court reasoned that the increase complied with the

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

692

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

agreed upon service schedule and was therefore permitted. As such, the
Court reversed the decision of the arbitration board.
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS
Bankruptcy
Bankr. D. Delaware
Green Field Energy Servs., Inc. v. Moreno, No. 13-12783(KG), 2018 WL
4629302 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 27, 2018).
Debtor’s estate Trustee sued Special Purpose Entities (“SPEs”) for breach
of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. Trustee sought to avoid transfers
made in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Debtor was an oil service
business that engineered the use of frac pressure pumps powered by aeroderivative turbine engines. During a decline in demand for frac services,
Debtor sought alternative sources of capital from the SPEs. Debtor filed for
bankruptcy in 2013. The court held that Trustee could not recover from the
SPEs manager for the preferential transfers as an “entity for whose benefit
the transfers were made.” The court reasoned that because Trustee could
not demonstrate that the manager had access to the transfers Trustee had not
met the burden of proof and could not recover any portions of the transfers
from the manager.
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
Federal
3d Cir.
Giovanni v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 906 F.3d 94 (3d Cir. 2018).
Landowners sued Department of the Navy (“Navy”) for an array of health
monitoring services after it was discovered that dangerous chemicals from
Navy’s facilities had entered the water supply. The chemicals in question
have been shown to increase the risk of testicular, kidney, and thyroid
cancers. Navy asserted a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under a
provision of CERCLA. The provision in question, as interpreted by the
district court, would prevent state or federal courts from exercising personal
jurisdiction because it would interfere with the current cleanup of the area.
The appellate court engaged in the statutory interpretation of CERCLA in
order to determine whether the district court correctly decided that these
claims were barred by CERCLA. The appellate court determined that
certain claims met the definition of “challenges” to the cleanup and would
be barred by CERCLA, but that others—like the cost of private party
medical monitoring—were not. The court clarified that the types of
“challenges” that lack subject matter jurisdiction under the law are those:
(1) which delay or interfere with a cleanup; (2) which question the cleanup
plan; or (3) where the relief requested interferes with the cleanup.
5th Cir.
United States v. Nature’s Way Marine, L.L.C., 904 F.3d 416 (5th Cir.
2018).
United States (“Government”) brought action against Tugboat Owner
(“Owner”) seeking to recover the cost of money spent by various agencies
to clean up an oil spill on the Mississippi River. The spill occurred when
two oil-carrying barges moved by Owner collided with a bridge. Owner
spent $2.99 million on clean-up, and various government agencies spent an
addition $792,000. Government initiated litigation to recover the $792,000
spent on clean-up from Owner. Owner claimed it was not liable and
counterclaimed that the National Pollution Funds Center (“NPFC”) violated
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) “by deeming it to be an
‘operator’ of the barge and consequently ineligible for reimbursement of the
$2.13 million-plus’ that Owner spent on clean up.” Government moved for,
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and the trial court granted, partial summary judgement finding only that the
NPFC did not violate the APA by declaring owner an “operator” of the
barge and denying reimbursement of clean-up costs. Owner appealed and
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that
the statutory interpretation of the word “operator” under the OPA would
“include someone who directs, manages, or conducts the affairs of the
vessel.” It then follows that “operating” a vessel under the OPA would
include piloting or moving the vessel. This definition is based on the
Supreme Court’s analysis of the word “operator” in a similar statute.
Because Owner navigated the barge through the river requiring a great
degree of discretion and judgment, it would be a strain beyond the ordinary
meaning of the word to say Owner was not “operating” the barge at the
time of collision.
10th Cir.
Audubon Soc’y of Greater Denver v. U.S. Army of Corps of Eng’rs, 908
F.3d 593 (10th Cir. 2018).
Organization filed petition for judicial review of approval of U.S. Army of
Corps of Engineers’ (“Engineers”) project to store more water in reservoir.
Organization argued that approval of the project did not comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”). The petition was denied, and Organization appealed. NEPA
required Engineers to include an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”)
“in every recommendation or report on proposals for . . . major Federal
actions.” An EIS must “inform decision-makers and the public of the
reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts.”
Organization argued Engineers failed to do so. In choosing to store more
water in the reservoir, Engineers initially proposed thirty-eight alternatives,
which they narrowed down to the four options that best addressed the
purpose, cost, and impacts of the project. Engineers chose the third option,
deciding it best minimized costs and met the needs of the project.
Organization argues that Engineers dismissed the three other options
without sufficient explanation, and suggested even more alternatives. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Engineers’ decision to not
analyze these options was not “arbitrary or capricious.” The court noted
found that Engineers appropriately explained why they disregarded other
alternatives, finding them unviable. Further, under CWA, Organization
argued that Engineers did not appropriately analyze alternatives to
permitting discharge of materials. The court found that, because the scope
of the analysis was ambiguous, the court should defer to agency expertise.
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The court also found that Engineers’ interpretation was not plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. As such, the court affirmed
the district court’s decision.
D.C. Cir.
Angelex, Ltd. v. United States, 907 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Shipowner brought action against Coast Guard for allegedly unreasonably
detaining its vessel for six months pending criminal trial pursuant to the Act
to Prevent Pollution from Ships (“Act”). In accordance with the Act, Coast
Guard requires that ships maintain a record book of discharges into the sea,
and violation of this provision constitutes a felony. When Coast Guard
agents inspected the ship, one of the crew members passed a note saying
that the operator was using a special pipe to discharge oil and other
contaminants without logging them. Coast Guard deemed this to be
reasonable cause to believe a violation was committed and revoked
clearance required to leave an American port pursuant to the Act. Further,
Coast Guard and Shipowner entered into negotiations to set bond to allow
the ship to leave pending trial. Coast Guard demanded $2.5 million for
bond, with additional non-monetary conditions, which Shipowner refused.
Because the maximum fine in this situation was $3 million, the court
determined the bond amount to be reasonable. Further, the court stated that
since the Coast Guard was explicitly given the power to detain the ship with
reasonable cause, and the Ship Owner was indicted, the Coast Guard did
not act unreasonably in detaining the ship. As such, the court affirmed
summary judgment for the Coast Guard.
D. Colorado
Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Civ. No. 1:16-cv01822-LTB, 2018 WL 5043909 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2018).
Non-profit challenged U.S. Bureau of Land Management’s (“Bureau”)
Resource Management Plan (“RMP”) regarding land in the Colorado River
Valley. Non-profit used the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to bring
suit against Bureau, as the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
does not provide for a private cause of action. Non-profit alleged the
Bureau’s RMP violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
because, according to non-profit, it had failed to closely examine the
impacts to the people and environment and consider a reasonable range of
alternatives. Specifically, Non-profit claimed Bureau failed in its RMP to
adequately review the severity and impacts of greenhouse gas emissions,
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methane emissions, their impact on climate change, and the effects of oil
and gas on human health. Court determined that Bureau violated NEPA by
failing to closely scrutinize the indirect effects resulting from the
combustion of oil and gas in the RMP’s considered land area, due to Bureau
using energy output estimates in the RMP, but failing to estimate effects of
those outputs. The district court found Bureau properly conducted a
meaningful cumulative impact analysis regarding potential impact on
climate change. The court determined Bureau was not required, as Nonprofit suggested, to perform cost-benefit analysis regarding GHG
emissions. The court did not find Bureau breached its obligation to examine
methane potency in its RMP, nor did Bureau improperly use industry
assumptions regarding emission volume of methane. However, the district
court did determine that, in failing to consider reasonable alternatives that
would meaningfully limit oil and gas leasing and development within the
planning area, BLM violated NEPA.
D. District of Columbia
Moncrief v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018).
Lessee sought summary judgment against the Department of Interior
(“DOI”) and director of the local Bureau of Land Management (“Director”)
for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Mineral
Leasing Act (“MLA”). More than thirty years after a federal oil and gas
lease was suspended from drilling and extracting activities, DOI and
Director cancelled the lease without giving notice to Lessee. Generally,
agencies have the power to revisit and rescind their previous decisions,
including those granting leases, so long as that power is exercised within a
reasonable amount of time. All agency decisions and actions must be
reasonable with reasonable explanations. Under the APA, an agency’s
action is arbitrary and capricious rather than reasonable if: (1) the agency
relied on factors outside of those Congress intended be considered; (2) the
agency completely failed to consider an important element of the issue it
decided on; or (3) the agency offered an explanation for its action or
decision that is contrary to the evidence available. Reasonableness in light
of cancelling a lease must include consideration of the Lessee’s reliance
interests at stake. Furthermore, arbitrary cancellation of a federal lease
without notice and wrongdoing on Lessee’s behalf violates Lessee’s bona
fide purchaser rights under the MLA. According to various environmental
impact statements that Director contributed to over the years, the land the
lease applied to was appropriate for use; however, Director continued to
suspend the lease. Eventually, that land was incorporated into a Native
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American “traditional cultural district.” Lessee requested a hearing with
DOI, which DOI never responded to. The lease was subsequently cancelled.
The court granted Lessee’s motion for summary judgment because DI and
Director’s decision failed to consider Lessee’s reliance interest and because
they cancelled the lease without providing any notice.

This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the
higher court as of publication.
E.D. Michigan
Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep't of State, No. CV-17-29-GF-BMM,
2018 WL 5840768 (D. Mont. Nov. 8, 2018).
Environmentalists continue to oppose the Keystone Pipeline. This case
centers on a motion for summary judgment and an alleged violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Environmentalists offered several
claims as to how Department violated the APA. The court denied
Environmentalists’ first contention, claiming that Company’s purpose
statement was insufficient. Next, the court dismissed the contention that
Department failed to consider all appropriate alternatives. The court found
that Department considered all relevant alternatives. The court then refused
to consider some lesser claims. The court, however, did find that
Department failed to comply with NEPA and the APA in its failure to fully
articulate its reasoning in its record of decision. The court remanded the
issue to Department with instructions for Department to fully explain its
reasoning in a way that does not contradict itself.

This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the
higher court as of publication.
E.D. Washington
All. for the Wild Rockies v. Pena, No. 2:16-CV-294-RMP, 2018 WL
4760503 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2018).
Conservationists challenged U.S. Forestry Service’s (“Forestry”) approval
of a new restoration, logging, and timber sale project. Conservationists
challenged the validity of the bidding process for the contract, which went
to a private Third-Party. Third-Party then, per the contract, sub-contracted
another company to perform an environmental impact assessment of the
proposed project. Conservationists claimed conflict of interest with regards
to the contract bidding as well as claiming the environmental analysis and
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Forestry’s approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious. The district
court determined that Conservationists lacked standing to sue under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) or the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”), due to Conservationist’s lack of injury-in-fact, yet
continued to rule on the merits of Conservationists’ claims to complete the
record for review. First, the court determined that the bidding competition
under the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) was open and fair,
and the contract award was proper. The court could find no conflict of
interest and reasoned that even had there been a conflict of interest,
Forestry’s oversight of the environmental assessment would have cured
such defect. The court also found Forestry did not violate NEPA, because a
proper environmental analysis was carried out. The court found no defect in
the manner in which sub-contractor performed the environmental analysis,
particularly with regards to the separation of the project into two different
geographical areas for analysis. Conservationists could not raise a genuine
issue of material fact regarding its claims that the environmental assessment
failed to consider the overall impact of the project on fish-bearing streams
and furbearing populations.
W.D. Washington
Coalview Centralia, LLC v. Transalta Centralia Mining LLC, No. C185639 RBL, 2018 WL 5619027 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2018).
The case arises out of a dispute over the performance of a series of
agreements related to the reclamation of a coal mine and associated power
plants. The company that owned the mine (“Mining”) hired a reclamation
firm (“Reclamation”) to clean up and restore three waste coal slurry
impoundment sites (“ponds”). The contract specifically at issue in this case
was the Master Services Agreement (“MSA”). Subsequently, a dispute
arose concerning the invoices. Mining refused to pay invoices submitted by
Reclamation, alleging Mining overpaid Reclamation for work completed
and threatening to terminate the relationship if Reclamation did not refund
the excess payments. Reclamation sued, claiming Mining breached the
parties’ agreements, and sought to (1) enjoin Mining from terminating the
relationship and (2) require Mining to comply with the “continuing to
diligently perform while the dispute is resolved” aspect of the MSA. The
trial court granted the temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The court made
its judgement based on four factors: (1) Reclamation can show a chance of
success on the merits because, at the very least, there are serious questions
as to how the merits of Reclamation’s claims would play out and a verdict
for Mining is not guaranteed; (2) Reclamation can show that the absence of
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a TRO would result in irreparable harm, namely that Reclamation would
close and cease to exist; (3) the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of
Reclamation and in favor of injunction, because if no injunction was
granted and Reclamation shut down, Mining would have no means for
recovering the alleged debt owed by Reclamation and Reclamation could
not recover the alleged unpaid invoices; and (4) the public interest goes to
granting the TRO because the public interest would not be served by the
clean-up work stop altogether. For these reasons the trial court granted the
TRO.
State
California
High Sierra Rural All. v. Cty. of Plumas, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2018).
Environmental Group challenged County’s adoption of a city plan update
and Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) as required under California
Environmental Quality Act. Environmental Group challenges the EIS and
County Plan (“CP”) in areas outside of the current planning area.
Environmental Group alleged that the CP violated the California
Timberland Productivity Act of 1982 (“Act”) and Government Code
Section 51104 (“Code”). Environmental Group also argued that the EIS
was defective because it did not take into account newly allowed clustered
subdivisions, and that it should be recirculated because County added
substantial information about the development after the comment period
had closed. The district court found that the CP did not violate the Act
because it failed to recite the statutory language in the Code, and because
that section was sufficient to provide restrictions on structures in timber
production zones. Additionally, the EIS adequately analyzed reasonably
foreseeable development within the area. The EIS was thus sufficient
because the population of the county was decreasing, and development
outside of the current planning area was unlikely. If there were to be new
developments, County would undergo additional analysis.
Save Our Heritage Organization v. City of San Diego, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d
231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
A heritage organization (“Organization”) had been trying to gain pedestrian
access to historic portions of an urban park. As part of the longwinded
litigation, Organization filed a writ of mandamus challenging City’s grant
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of an environmental impact report (“EIR”) for changes to the project. The
lower court affirmed City’s approval. Under the California Environmental
Quality Act (“CEQA”), addendums could be made to EIRs to make
corrections without creating an entirely new EIR and without making any
new findings. When changes were made to the park plan to meet current
City standards, City did not conduct another EIR, but rather, made minor
adjustments through an addendum within the existing EIR. Organization
felt that the changes were significant enough to require a new EIR, and that
City, by not requiring a new EIR, was neglecting an express duty. However,
the reasons City gave for not requiring a new EIR met the relevant
standards under CEQA, so no other EIR was conducted. CEQA requires
that City balance the public environmental consequences with the finality
and efficiency of the decision. The court determined that Organization did
not meet its burden in showing that the addendum process was invalid
because the changes were minor, made pursuant to City codes and green
initiative standards, and made the park more accessible. Furthermore, the
addendum process and guidelines were appropriate under federal law and
were a proper use of the State’s traditional police powers.
Indiana
Elkhart Foundry & Mach. Co. v. City of Elkhart Redev. Comm'n, 112
N.E.3d 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
This case centers on an appeal as to which statute governs the statute of
limitations for environmental lawsuits in Indiana. City, who won at the trial
court, contended that a statute relating to environmental legal actions
governed, as did its ten-year statute of limitations. Company argued that the
general statutes governing property injuries and its six-year statute of
limitations governed. The appellate court sided with the trial court,
affirming that the ten-year environmental legal action statute of limitations
governed. Through statutory interpretation, the court found that the
language of the environmental legal action statute is meant to be considered
the appropriate statute of limitations in this case. The court disregarded
Company’s argument because the case it cited was filed two years before
the enactment of the relevant statute. The court then declined to decide
issues relating to Indiana’s mini-CERCLA. The court then analyzed City’s
claim of a continuing nuisance resulting from the site’s contamination. The
court sided with Company, because according to Indiana case law, there
must be continued activity to constitute a continuing nuisance. The mere
continued existence of the pollution was insufficient. Therefore, City
missed the six-year statute of limitations for this cause of action.
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New York
Nat. Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Scheuckler, 88 N.Y.S.3d 305 (N.Y. App.
Div. Nov. 9, 2018).
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) granted Company’s
application to construct a natural gas pipeline. Company then attempted,
under Eminent Domain Procedure Law, to acquire easements over Owners
property. Company argued it did not need to have a public hearing or
finding about eminent domain because FERC’s certificate exempted it.
Owner argued that because Company had its application denied under the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”), its certificate was invalid under FERC. The
lower court granted Company’s petition, which Owners appealed. The
appellate court found that Company was not exempt from Eminent Domain
Procedure Law under FERC because the certificate issued to Company was
“subject to” various conditions. One such condition was that, through the
CWA, Company must receive a water quality certification, which Company
failed to do. Because State did not issue Company a water qualification
certification, Company’s FERC Certificate was made invalid. As such, the
court reversed, holding that Owners had no exemption and no certificate.
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